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Intuitionism’s disagreement with classical logic is standardly based on its specific understanding of truth. But
different intuitionists have actually explicated the notion of truth in fundamentally different ways. These are
considered systematically and separately, and evaluated critically. It is argued that each account faces difficult
problems. They all either have implausible consequences or are viciously circular.
1. Introduction
Intuitionism is famous for its denial of the validity of certain traditionally accepted
laws of logic, in particular, the law of the excludedmiddle1 (in short, LEM). Its revision
of logic is, however, only a consequence of certain more fundamental theses of
intuitionism, namely its specific way of understanding the notions of existence and
truth.2 Namely, a characteristic feature of intuitionism is the requirement that the
notion of truth of a proposition should be explained in terms of the notion of proof, or
verification,3 rather than as correspondence with some sort ofmind-independent realm
ofmathematical objects; from this one concludes that not every sentence is either true or
false. Analogously, the existence ofmathematical objects is analysed in terms ofmental
constructions rather than understood as some kind of mind-independent existence.
But how exactly are truth and existence explained in these constructivistic terms?
It is my aim in this paper to show that the exact details are far less clear than has been
usually thought. To begin with, let us distinguish the following two, fundamentally
different cases:
(a) A has been proved;
(b) A is (in principle) provable;
1 Often what the intuitionists attack under the name of LEM is not actually LEM but the principle of bivalence;
strictly speaking, these two should be distinguished (see e.g. Dummett 1978, p. xix). However, under certain default
assumptions, accepted by intuitionists, these two are equivalent (see e.g. Pagin 1998). Consequently, in what follows I
shall not be overly pedantic on this issue.
2 This is not the only possibility; some, most notably Heyting, rebut the whole notion of truth, and proceed directly to
give a meaning-explanation of the logical constants, an explanation under which LEM etc. fail. But the basic
question of this paper (see below), whether one should adopt the actualist or the possibilist approach, remains. I shall
argue that Heyting is still deeply committed to the actualist picture, with all its problems; see below.
Also some recent constructivists such as Bishop and Bridges avoid talk of truth, but their explanation of
constructivism closely leans on the possibilist picture (see below). Thus Bishop explains ‘the basic constructivist goal’
as being ‘that mathematics concern itself with the precise description of finitely performable abstract operations . . .
Thus by ‘‘constructive’’ I shall mean a mathematics that describes or predicts the results of certain finitely
performable, albeit hypothetical, computations within the set of integers’ (Bishop 1970, p. 53 my emphasis). Bridges,
in turn, writes: ‘Constructive mathematics is distinguished from its traditional counterpart, classical mathematics, by
the strict interpretation of the phrase ‘‘there exists’’ as ‘‘we can construct’’ ’ (Bridges 1997, my emphasis).
3 Some (e.g. Heyting; see below) rather want to eliminate the concept of truth and replace it e.g. by the possession of
proof or by the possibility of proof. For my purposes here, however, this makes little difference.
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and, analogously,
(a’) n has been constructed;
(b’) n is (in principle) constructible.
Now it would be possible to equate truth and existence with either of these
cases, respectively. In order to have convenient terms to speak of these
alternative approaches, I shall refer to the first, temporal conception as the
actualist notion, and to the second, non-temporal notion as the possibilist notion,
of truth or existence, respectively. Although many recent expositions of
intuitionism give the impression that it is definitely the possibilist notion that
is intended by intuitionists, I shall argue that the real situation is much more
complicated and problematic. Correspondingly, quite many critical discussions
have actually focused solely on some particular variant of intuitionism. As too
many treatments of intuitionism have given an oversimplified picture of the field,
I shall first attempt to give a more accurate picture of the variety of
intuitionistic views, and only after that proceed to more systematic issues and
critical considerations.
2. Classical intuitionism: Brouwer and Heyting
When one considers intuitionism, it is natural to begin with L. E. J. Brouwer, the
founding father of intuitionism. So what is Brouwer’s view on truth? The answer is not
fully clear. Many of Brouwer’s statements on truth seem to commit him to
straightforward actualism, according to which truth is significantly temporal, and
assertions become true only when the relevant experience of thought-construction
occurs, i.e. there are no truths which have not already been experienced:
Truth is only in reality, i.e. in the present and past experiences of consciousness. . . .
expected experiences and experiences attributed to others are true only as anticipations and
hypotheses; in their contents there is no truth.
Brouwer 1948
[The original Dutch version simply says: ‘Expected experiences as such and the reputed
experiences of others as such are not truths . . . there are no non-experienced truths.’
van Stigt 1990 (p. 204)]
. . . in mathematics no truths could be recognized which had not been experienced.
Brouwer 1955
Correctness of an assertion then has no other meaning than that its content has in fact
appeared in the consciousness of the subject.
Brouwer 1951
In other words, here Brouwer thinks that a proposition is true only if it has been
actually proved (and an object exists only if it has been actually constructed). Under
this interpretation LEM is obviously false. Even a platonist must agree that not every
proposition has yet been either proved or refuted, although he or she is likely to add
that this is simply not what is normally meant by LEM.
132 Panu Raatikainen
Sometimes, however, in some of his criticisms of classical logic, Brouwer
rather seems to equate truth with the possibility of proof, that is, provability in
principle.4 In such contexts Brouwer does not at all speak about presently
unsolved problems, as the above temporal conception of truth would suggest,
but only about absolutely unsolvable problems (see van Stigt 1990, pp. 252–254),
that is, he disputes Hilbert’s thesis that every mathematical problem can be
solved. As early as 1908 Brouwer wrote that the principle of the excluded middle
‘claims that every supposition is either true or false’ and that the question of its
validity ‘is equivalent to the question whether unsolvable mathematical questions
can exist’:
Now consider the pricipium tertii exclusi: It claims that every supposition is either true or
false; in mathematics this means that for every supposed imbedding of a system into
another, satisfying certain given conditions, we can either accomplish such an imbedding
by a construction, or we can arrive by a construction at the arrestment of the process which
would lead to the imbedding. It follows that the question of the validity of the pricipium
tertii exclusi is equivalent to the question whether unsolvable mathematical problems can
exist. There is not a shred of a proof for the conviction . . . that there exist no unsolvable
mathematical problems.
Insofar as only finite discrete systems are introduced, the investigation whether an
imbedding is possible or not, can always be carried out and admits a definite results, so in
this case the pricipium tertii exclusi is reliable as a principle of reasoning.
Brouwer 1908, p. 109 (my emphasis)
In the 1920s and 1930s Brouwer attempted intensively to provide a concrete
example of an absolutely unsolvable problem which would convince the wider
audience of the non-validity of LEM (see van Stigt 1990, pp. 252–254). That was, at
the time, the aim of Brouwer’s well-known ‘counterexamples’.
In his later years, Brouwer abandoned this search for absolutely unsolvable
problems5 and returned to the actualist formulations (see van Stigt 1990, pp. 254–
255). In the 1950s, however, Brouwer endorsed actualism in a somewhat liberalized
form. More exactly, he now insisted that the dichotomy between true and false must
be replaced by the following four cases:6
(1) true=has been proved to be true;
(2) false/impossible/absurd=has been proved to be absurd;
(3) At present neither true or false, but we know an algorithm which decides the
assertion;
(4) At present neither true or false, and we do not know an algorithm which
would decide the assertion.
4 Possibly just because of the problem just mentioned, namely, that Brouwer realized that very few would accept his
austere actualist notion of truth and falsity as being actually proved and being actually refuted, respectively (van Stigt
1990, p. 248).
5 One might think that he was destined to fail, because it is arguable that the idea of an absolutely unsolvable problem
makes no sense intuitionistically; see e.g. Heyting 1958b, Dummett (1977, p. 17), Pagin 1998; see also below.
6 I have put this together from three different, very similar sources: Brouwer 1951, 1951–52 and 1955.
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According to Brouwer, case 3 is temporary. Moreover, Brouwer says that it
‘obviously is reducible to the first and second cases’ (Brouwer 1951–52, p. 454). I find it
quite unclear what exactly he means here; if this is meant to say that a statement for
which we know an algorithm which would decide it positively is true, it seems he
already has compromised the actualist position. But in any case, Brouwer now claims
that each mathematical statement which is in the fourth case yields a refutation of the
LEM; he gives as an example then unproved (but, as is well known, now proved)
Fermat’s last theorem (Brouwer 1955)! Moreover, he also notes that an assertion in
this fourth case may at some times pass into one of the other cases: ‘one must take into
account the possibility that one day a method may be found’ (Brouwer 1951, p. 451).
Thus also the line between cases 3 and 4 may change with time. Therefore, Brouwer’s
view here does not amount to the standard possibilist view either—the latter being
non-temporal.7
In sum, Brouwer’s formulations have oscillated—in a rather puzzling way—
between the actualist and possibilist ones, that is, between the idea that truth equals
actual possession of proof and the idea that truth consist of a mere possibility of
constructing a proof. This may have been the source of related unclarity and
confusion in the intuitionistic literature ever since.
Be that as it may, let us next consider the views of Arend Heyting, the most
important student and follower of Brouwer, who among other things systematized
and formalized intuitionistic logic (cf. Frachella 1994). Now at first sight, Heyting may
seem rather unhelpful in the case of the notion of truth, for according to him, ‘[t]he
notion of truth makes no sense [. . .] in intuitionistic mathematics’ (Heyting 1958a).
Heyting understands ‘truth’ here exclusively in the classical correspondence sense:
‘One can only speak of genuine mathematical truth if there is a mathematical reality to
which it is related. . . . to me personally the assumption of an abstract reality of any
sort seem meaningless’ (Heyting 1958a).
However, Heyting is not altogether silent on the choice between the actualist
and the possibilist approach. In 1930, Heyting first attacked the classical notion of
‘p is true’ for implying the idea of transcendent existence. The continuation is very
interesting: he next criticizes Levy for replacing ‘p is true’ by ‘p is provable’. One
does not, according to Heyting, thus escape the criticism, for ‘p is provable’, being
equivalent to ‘there exists a proof of p’, implies again the idea of transcendent
existence. Instead, one must replace the classical notion with ‘one knows how to
prove p’ (Heyting 1930). That is, although Heyting prefers to avoid the notion of
truth, he nevertheless clearly rebuts here the possibilist notion in favour of the
actualist approach. Again, he wrote in 1958: ‘We simply cannot speak about the
truth-value of a proposition which has neither been proved true nor proved false’
(Heyting 1958b, p. 109). In the same spirit, he in 1959 explicated the notion of
existence actualistically:
. . . object is only considered as existing after it has been constructed . . . I am unable to give
any intelligible sense to the assertion that a mathematical object which has not been
constructed, exists. . . . A formula of the form (Ax)A(x) can have no other meaning than: ‘A
mathematical object x satisfying the condition has been constructed ’.
Heyting 1959, p. 69 (my emphasis)
7 I shall return to views like this (which I shall call ‘liberalized actualism’) later in the paper.
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Heyting, too, was not always faithful to his actualism. In some contexts he rather
explains existence in possibilistic terms:
. . .the existence of [a natural number] N signifies nothing but the possibility of actually
producing a number with the requisite property, and the non-existence of N signifies the
possibility of deriving a contradiction from this property. Since we do not know whether or
not one of these possibilities exists, we may not assert that N either exists or does not exist.
Heyting 1931, p. 108 (my emphasis)
Nevertheless, it is safe to conclude that on most occasions, Heyting is inclined
towards the actualist approach.
For Heyting (at least in the 1950s), however, intuitionistic and classical logic
do not as such conflict, for they concern, according to him, wholly different
issues; he called the former the logic of knowledge and the latter the logic of being,
i.e. the former express, in his view, what is known as true, whereas the latter what
is true (Heyting 1956a, 1958b). There is as such no disagreement here between
intuitionism and realism, for even a hard-core platonist agrees that not every
statement is at present known to be true or known to be false. However we have
also seen that Heyting condemns the logic of being (or truth, i.e. classical logic) as
meaningless, leaving the (intuitionistic) logic of knowledge as the only acceptable
logic.
Now given the sad history of failure for all attempts to provide an adequate
criterion of meaningfulness, one should today be rather suspicious concerning any
such complaints of meaninglessness. And the reasons Heyting gives are hardly
conclusive; he simply notes that he personally cannot make sense of classical ideas.
Further, if one accepts Brouwer’s view on meaningfulness, the issue gets truly
puzzling, for Brouwer apparently thought that a statement is meaningful only if it has
been proved.8 And certainly it is only with respect to meaningful statements that the
question of truth, falsity, or the lack of truth-value can be at all raised. But restricted
to them, Brouwer’s view apparently entails the principle of bivalence: every
meaningful statement is either true or false, because every meaningful (i.e. proved)
statement is true (i.e. proved).
In sum, it is not altogether easy to form, from the basis of classical intuitionism, a
coherent picture of the intuitionistic notion of truth (and existence). It simply seems as
if classical intuitionism has not always been aware enough of the deep difference
between the actualist and the possibilist view. Still, it has most often gravitated—
contrary to the popular impression—towards actualism.
3. Contemporary intuitionism: Dummett and Prawitz
It is quite remarkable that apparently the first spokesman of intuitionism who has
clearly distinguished what I have called the actualist and the possibilist conception,
has been Michael Dummett, and as late as in the 1970s.9 But even for him, the issue
has not always been that clear, and his views on truth have altered much more than
has been generally recognized.
8 See van Stigt (1990, p. 212); cf. also the quote from Heyting 1959 above. Brouwer appeals especially often to the
meaninglessness of classical mathematics in Brouwer 1912.
9 See, however, the comments in Heyting 1930, quoted above.
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In his 1963 paper ‘Realism’,10 and later in his 1973 book on Frege, Dummett in
fact explicitly endorsed the actualist view (see Dummett 1963, pp. 163–164; Dummett
1973, p. 468). In Elements of Intuitionism (Dummett 1977) Dummett appeared to
prefer the possibilist notion, for he wrote that it would be possible for a constructivist
to agree with a platonist that a mathematical statement, if true, is timelessly true:
when a statement is proved, then it is shown thereby to have been true all along. To
say this, in effect, he continued, is to equate ‘A is true’ with ‘We can prove A’ rather
than with ‘A has been proved’, and ‘A is false’ with ‘We cannot prove A’ (Dummett
1977, p. 19). But the continuation is rather puzzling: Dummett concludes that ‘We can
prove A’ must be understood as being rendered true only by our actually proving A,
but as being rendered false only by our finding a purely mathematical obstacle of
proving it (Dummett 1977, p. 19). This seems after all to reduce Dummett’s view to
some kind of actualism. I must say that I find it difficult to understand what exactly
Dummett was trying to say here.
Although Dummett has most often been rather careful not to commit himself
too strongly to any particular doctrine, he has nevertheless pointed out,
influentially, certain counter-intuitive consequences of the simple actualist temporal
notion of truth, that is, the idea that the truth of a sentence consists of our actual
possession of a proof (Dummett 1975a, 1975b).11 In order to present them, one
must first make the distinction between a direct, or ‘canonical’ proof, and an
indirect proof, that is, an effective means, in principle, for obtaining a (canonical)
proof. Assume next that the actualist view of truth is correct. Must one then
possess necessarily a direct proof of a statement, or does an indirect proof of it
suffice, for the statement to be true?
Now the first of Dummett’s arguments, based on the so-called paradox of
inference, concerns the possibility that one equates truth of a statement with the actual
possession of a direct (canonical) proof of it. If we assume that an indirect deductive
inference must be of some use, that an epistemic advance is in its case possible, then it
must be possible that the premise of the inference is recognized to be true without the
conclusion having been. It is also plausible to require that the inference is truth
preserving. But then, if truth is equated with possession of direct proof, no indirect
valid (i.e. truth preserving) inference could be useful (Dummett 1975b, pp. 313–314; cf.
Prawitz 1987, p. 151). Further, if truth is equated with possession of an actual direct
proof, ‘then we shall have to allow that a statement may be asserted even though it is
not known to be true’ (Dummett 1975a, p. 243).
If, on the other hand, one equates truth of a statement with actual possession of a
mere indirect proof of it, then truth will not distribute over disjunction; i.e. it would
then be possible that e.g. A _ B is true (that is, one actually possesses an indirect proof
of it) although neither A nor B be is true (because one does not happen to possess
proof of either) (see Dummett 1975a, p. 243; Prawitz 1987, pp. 139, 153). Moreover,
‘[on] either view, naturally, a valid rule of inference will not always lead from true
premisses to a true conclusion, namely if we have not explicitly drawn the inference’
(Dummett 1975a, p. 243).
10 Dummett 1963 (not to be confused with Dummett 1982 with the same title); in his 1978 introduction to the collection
in which it was published Dummett regarded this paper ‘as very crude and as mistaken in many respects’ (Dummett
1978, p. xxx).
11 Very recently, Dummett has become less cautious; he now states that ‘[t]he canons of correct reasoning in
intuitionistic mathematics debar us from restricting true statements to those we have actually proved’ (Dummett
2003, p. 19).
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The following example, which derives from Prawitz,12 nicely illustrates the
counter-intuitive character of the actualist notion of truth: Assume that ‘A is true’
really meant the same as ‘A has been proved’. Consider then the following credible
claim:
(1) If somebody possesses a proof that there exist infinitely many twin primes,
then somebody knows a great deal about prime numbers.
But it is far from clear that one can on the basis of (1) conclude, as the actualist view
would require, that:
(2) If it is true that there exist infinitely many twin primes, then somebody knows
a great deal about prime numbers.
Apparently due to various counter-intuitive consequences such as these, the great
majority of contemporary intuitionists have favoured unqualifiedly the possibilist
view. However, although Dummett has certainly expressed clearly the problems
that the simple actualist view faces, he has never adhered to the standard possibilist
view either. Commenting on the above problems with actualism, Dummett once
said that it is natural to relax slightly the requirement that a proof should have
been explicitly given; the question is, he adds, how far we may consistently go
along this path (Dummett 1975a, p. 243). And this is indeed a difficult problem. But
before discussing in more detail how exactly Dummett has tried to answer to it, let
us consider a different approach Dummett has also sympathised with on some
occasions.
Namely, in some desperate moments,13 Dummett has—in order to avoid the
difficult problems we shall soon consider—preferred the view that actually
intuitionism can dispense with any substantial notion of truth beyond the thinnest,
disquotational one.14 He then granted that if the intuitionist admits a more substantial
of notion of truth, he will be driven to posit proofs as objectively existing, as Prawitz
has done, but Dummett is certainly not ready to do:15
But if the intuitionist were to admit a notion of truth more substantial than the thinnest, he
would have to say that the proposition was true just in case a proof of it existed, where its
existence was independent of whether the speaker or anyone else knew of it, just as, in fact,
Prawitz says. I do not (at least at the moment) believe that the intuitionist needs to admit
such a notion at all, involving himself in the labour of explaining that notion of existence.
Dummett 1994a (p. 295)
Instead of allowing ourselves in these difficulties, it seems better to represent a
constructivist theory of meaning for mathematical statements as dispensing with the
notion of truth altogether.
Dummett 1982 (p. 259)
12 See Prawitz (1987, p. 137). Prawitz originally presented it in a somewhat different form in a different context; I have
slightly modified it.
13 Dummett 1982, 1994a.
14 In his early classic, 1959 paper ‘Truth’, Dummett had already recommended accepting the redundancy theory of
truth.
15 See below. Note how similar Dummett’s view here is to that of Heyting’s.
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However, the price of this line of Dummett is also high: Usually intuitionists admit
that every natural number is either prime or composite, since we have a method that in
principle decides the question. But this, Dummett admits, already commits one to a
substantial notion of truth:
The intuitionist sanctions the assertion, for any natural number, however large, that it
is either prime or composite, since we have a method that will, at least in principle,
decide the question. But suppose that we do not, and perhaps in practice cannot,
apply the method: is there nevertheless a fact of the matter concerning whether the
number is prime or not? There is a strong impulse to say that there must be: for
surely there must be a definite answer to the question what we should get, were we to
apply our decision method. If we say this . . . [w]e shall nevertheless adopt a notion of
mathematical truth more robust than the pure disquotational notion. If the intuitionist
follows the strategy I proposed for him, he will have nothing to do with this or any
other notion of truth stronger than the disquotational one. In doing so, however, he
will require to be resolute: for he is resisting a line of thought that is overpoweringly
natural for us.
Dummett 1994a (pp. 296–297)
That is, an intuitionist following this strategy is obliged to deny this, in Dummett’s
own words, ‘overpoweringly natural’ idea. This austere view, although it aims to
avoid the difficult problems related to the more substantial intuitionistic notion of
truth, seems to lead to counter-intuitive consequences similar to those of the simple
actualist view. Heyting’s view seems to face the same problems.
More recently, Dummett has admitted that a semantics for intuitionistic
mathematics needs a notion of truth (Dummett 1998; see also Dummett 2003).
Dummett has on several occasions favoured a view that bears certain affinity to the
view endorsed by the later Brouwer—he considered it already in 1975 as a solution to
the above-mentioned problems with strict actualism (Dummett 1975a), and it is his
last published word on the issue (Dummett 1998; see also Dummett 1987). According
to this view, a statement is true if we are in fact in possession of a means of obtaining a
proof of it, whether or not we are aware of the fact. Let us call this middle position
‘liberalized actualism’.
But even though this liberalized notion avoids some of the problems of the simple
actualism mentioned above, it still makes truth significantly temporal (as Brouwer
explicitly pointed out, and as Dummett himself has at least in one occassion explicitly
admitted (Dummett 1994b), and for many, this may be a reason enough to rebut it.16
Prawitz has remarked that the analysis of such activities as conjecturing and
wondering seems to demand another notion of truth than the one suggested by
Dummett here (Prawitz 1998b). I think that the criticism in these terms could be
actually developed much further. Consider for example the following case:17
(3) Bob wonders whether the hypothesis H is true.
16 Indeed, Dummett himself has often expressed the desirability of a non-temporal notion of truth.
17 To make the examples more concrete: take H to be e.g. the Paris-Harrington sentence (finitary Ramsey’s theorem),
and assume that the methods of proof available in Bob’s time are limited to (a conservative extension of) Heyting
Arithmetic HA, which does not prove H. It is, however, provable with the help of (intuitionistically acceptable)
transfinite induction, which we may imagine to become accepted only much later.
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If we follow Dummett’s explication of the notion of truth, this should be equivalent
to:
(4) Bob wonders whether the hypothesis H can be proved by the methods we
presently possess.
But it should be abundantly clear that (3) and (4) express quite different thoughts, and
are in no way equivalent.
Or let us imagine that Bob conjectures that H is true. Assume then that it was
shown, in the distant future, that:
(i) H is actually undecidable by means of the mathematical methods of Bob’s time;
and:
(ii) H is provable by some new methods unknown at Bob’s time.
Should one then conclude that Bob’s conjecture thatH is true was incorrect? Certainly
not! But this should be the case if one accepted Dummett’s explication of the notion of
truth.
To put the point somewhat differently, we are apparently capable of acquiring new
methods of proofs, but Dummett’s position cannot account for the idea that these
must be sound or correct—or, in terms of axioms, the idea that when we introduce
new axioms, these must be true. The liberalized actualist notion of truth favoured by
Dummett attributes no truth-value to a statement undecidable by our present axioms
and methods, and seems to allow us to extend our theories arbitrarily. Thus this view
seems to lead to radical conventionalist with respect to all such presently undecidable
statements—a view Dummett seemingly cannot accept (see e.g. Dummett 1993).
Finally, as the totality of the methods of proof we possess at an any given time is
presumably in some sense finite, it is natural to assume that they can be captured by a
formalized system;18 but if this were the case, one could conclude, by Go¨del’s theorem,
that there is a true sentence which is not provable by these methods, contrary to the
claim that provability (by these methods) and truth coincide.
Prawitz, on the other hand, has always seen the possibilist notion of truth as the
only plausible option, convinced by the considerations such as those above. However,
the long dispute between him and Dummett on the notion of truth (Prawitz 1980,
1987, 1994, 1998a, 1998b; Dummett 1980, 1987, 1994a, 1998) has revealed how
extremely difficult it is to formulate more exactly the possibilist intuitionistic
conception of truth in a coherent way.
That is, the attempts to explicate the possibilist notion have led Prawitz, as was
noted above, to postulate an objective realm of proofs: ‘We may say that a
mathematical sentence is true if there exists a proof of it, in a tenseless or abstract
sense of exists’ (Prawitz 1987, p. 153). Prawitz admits that the identification of truth
with the mere possibility of a verification not necessarily realized by us ‘gives some
kind of objective reality to these verifications’ (Prawitz 1994, pp. 88–89).
18 The situation is even worse; the Go¨delian argument goes through if one merely assumes that these methods are, even
if not captured by a formalized system (i.e. not recursively enumerable, or 01), at least somewhere in the arithmetical
hierarchy (i.e. 0n for some n); cf. Appendix.
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Dummett, however, has found this unacceptable, for it leads, according to him,
either back to realism (i.e. to bivalence, which for Dummett is the essence of realism)
or to the conclusion that there are statements that absolutely have no truth-value,
which, according to Dummett, makes no sense in intuitionism (see below):
There is a well-known difficulty about thinking of mathematical proofs . . . as existing
independently of our hitting them, which insisting that they are proofs we are capable of
grasping of giving fails to resolve. Namely, it is hard to see how the equation of the falsity
of a statement (the truth of its negation) with the non-existence of a proof or a verification
could be resisted: but, then, it is equally hard to see how, on this conception of the
existence of proofs, we can resist supposing that that a proof of a given statement
determinately either exists or fails to exist. We shall then have driven ourselves into a
realist position, with a justification of bivalence.
If we refuse to identify falsity with the non-existence of a proof, we shall be little better
of, because we shall find it hard to resist concluding that there are statements which are
determinately neither true of false . . .
Dummett 1987 (p. 285)
And as has been mentioned, one can argue19 that the latter alternative is inconsistent
with intuitionism. The argument goes as follows: Assume that A is a sentence such
that neither A nor :A can be proved; A cannot be proved only if it can be proved that
A cannot be proved (since truth amounts to provability), but such a proof constitutes
proof of :A,20 contradicting the assumption that :A cannot be proved. Prawitz also
agrees with this, see e.g. Prawitz 1994, 1998b.
Prawitz has nevertheless defended his view of proofs as existing independently of
our knowledge of them against Dummett’s criticism, see Prawitz 1994, 1998a,b. He
says that although his view contains a flavour of realism, it is consistent with
intuitionism because one need not take the disjunction ‘either there exists a proof of A
or there does not exist a proof of A’ classically, but that one can interpret such a
disjunction intuitionistically (Prawitz 1998a).
Although this reply enables one to avoid the fatal consequences Dummett
mentions, it seems to me, nevertheless, to be highly problematic. It is a basic idea of
intuitionism that provability is a fundamental notion in terms of which the meanings
of logical constants are explained. If the explication of the notion of provability in
turn presupposes intuitionistic interpretation of logical constants, the whole account
appears to be viciously circular, or to lead to an infinite regress. Interestingly,
Dummett has in one occasion21 made essentially the same point; viz. in his seminal
‘The philosophical basis for intuitionistic logic’, Dummett stressed repeatedly that it is
‘wholly legitimate, and, indeed, essential’ to require that the intuitionistic notion of
truth must be explainable in terms which do not already presuppose the intuitionistic
understanding of the logical constants. For otherwise, intuitionists have no way of
conveying what it is that they were about to anyone who does not already accept their
ideas, and communication between intuitionists and non-converts would be
19 Cf. note 5.
20 This is because ‘A is not provable’ is true (according to intuitionism) if and only if it is provable; a proof that A is not
provable entails that A? B holds for any B, and thus in particular that A? ?, that is, that :A, cf. Dummett (1977,
p. 17).
21 Not as a reaction to Prawitz but already before their debate begun.
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impossible (Dummett 1975a, pp. 237–239). Further, if one admits that proofs have an
independent existence, it is quite unclear what motivation there is left for not allowing
the use of classical logic here.
Moreover, if one is prepared to be realist with respect to proofs, it is unclear why
one could not be realist with respect to, say, natural numbers,22 as Dummett again has
remarked in another context: ‘If we admit such a conception of proofs [as existing
independently of our knowledge], we can have no objection to a parallel conception of
mathematical objects such as natural numbers, real numbers, metric spaces, etc.; and
then shall have no motivation for abandoning a realistic, that is, platonist,
interpretation of mathematical statements in the first place’ (Dummett 1982, pp.
258–259). Here too I can only agree with Dummett.
In sum, if one accepts the objective existence of proof, the only way to avoid being
totally unfaithful to the whole spirit of intuitionism and to be lead to full-blown
realism, is evidently to appeal to already understood intuitionistic interpretation of
logical constants, which is seriously question-begging. Poincare´ once remarked that
people do not understand each other, because they do not speak the same language,
and because there are languages that cannot be learned.23 In Prawitz’s hands,
intuitionism threatens to turn into such a language.
4. A dilemma for the possibilist intuitionism
Let us now focus on the possibilist account of truth, which seems to be dominant
in the contemporary intuitionism.24 Whether or not it must necessarily commit itself
to an objective existence of proofs, there are certain considerations that in my mind
point out a decisive problem for it.
To begin with, it should be clear that the possibilist interpretation of intuitionist
truth must lean on some notion of possibility. For A’s provability in principle—in
contradistinction to the actual possession of a proof of A—means that it is (in some
sense) possible to prove A (and similarly for the possibilist notion of existence). But
one may then ask exactly what kind of possibility is meant here by the intuitionists.25
Certainly one cannot mean here physical possibility, nor psychological or in
general empirical possibility; intuitionists of different variants all agree with this: an
intuitionist must accept a certain amount of idealization and abstraction from such
empirical, non-mathematical contingencies. Otherwise one may be forced to conclude
a mathematical statement is false for some purely non-mathematical reasons.26 For it
is obvious that there are many mathematical statements for which it is psychologically
or physically impossible for us to construct a proof, but which would be provable in
22 The set of natural numbers is effectively generated, and the standard model of arithmetic is recursive (it is the only
recursive model of PA), whereas the totality of proofs (if the idea is assumed to make sense) cannot be even
arithmetical; see Appendix. Hence the former notion is much more simple and accessible than the latter. Therefore, it
would be quite preposterous to be realist only with respect to the latter but not with respect to the former.
23 Quoted in Brouwer 1912!
24 Although, as I have argued, it is a widespread mistake to count Dummett as an adherent of this view.
25 While later surveying the literature, I have found out that the same question (‘What kind of possibility?’) has been
raised, and sometimes a related argument hinted, by others: Parsons 1983 (passim), 1986, 1997, George 1993, and
Moore 1998. For me, however, the argument occurred independently of these; it was rather inspired by Sellars’
criticism of phenomenalism (see Sellars 1963). Interestingly, also Parsons (1986) notes the affinity between
intuitionism and phenomenalism.
26 Cf. e.g. Brouwer 1933, Heyting 1956b, Troelstra (1969, pp. 3–4), Dummett (1977, p. 19), Prawitz 1987, 1994, Martin-
Lo¨f 1995.
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principle—even by the methods we now possess. The possibility of proof intended by
the intuitionists must therefore be wider and more abstract than just the physical
possibility.
On the other extreme, there is the notion of logical possibility. And this is, in fact,
the choice of Per Martin-Lo¨f. He says that the notion of possibility, implicitly built
into the intuitionistic notion of truth, ‘is the notion of logical possibility, or possibility
in principle, as opposed to real, or practical, possibility, which takes resources and so
on into account’ (Martin-Lo¨f 1995, p. 193).
Now what is logically possible is obviously relative to a logic one uses. But if
intuitionistic logic is already assumed, a vicious circle threatens again. Also a strange
phenomenon occurs: The more metaphysically cautious and hence restricted logic one
chooses, the more becomes logically possibly provable and hence true. If we, on the
other hand, try to formulate the notion of logical possibility, or of freedom from
contradiction, without assuming any particular logic, we can only speak about
immediate contradictions—and freedom from them. Then any judgement that is not
immediately contradicting the set of previously somehow chosen set of truths (for
example, the standard axioms of elementary arithmetic) is free from contradiction and
hence possibly provable and true. For example, Goldbach’s conjecture and its
negation are both possibly provable and hence true; but then a contradiction would be
true.
The same problem occurs even if one would be allowed to use, say, intuitionistic
logic. Apparently for a very few sentences, the possibility of proof of the sentence is
ruled out by pure logic—intuitionistic or whatever. Certainly for most sentences, both
the provability of the sentence and the provability of its negation are logically
possible. However if this makes them true, then a contradiction is also true.
It thus appears that the idea that the notion of possibility used in the intuitionistic
notion of truth is logical possibility leads to various intolerable problems. Some
further constraints than just logical consistency are needed to delimit the possibility of
proof. Hence the possibility in question must be something narrower than logical
possibility.
Between physical and logical possibility, the kind of possibility that most naturally
suggests itself here is certainly mathematical possibility—it is even hard to imagine
what other kind of possibility it could be.27 And indeed, some passages of e.g.
Dummett, where he speaks about ‘a purely mathematical obstacle of proving’ a given
sentence A, seem to suggest that it may be mathematical possibility that intuitionists
have had in mind when they have spoken about provability in principle. It appears,
however, that the notion of mathematical possibility amounts to the consistency with
mathematical truth, and therefore already assumes the notion of mathematical truth.
But that would make the possibilist explication of truth absolutely circular. The more
restricted interpretation, which requires a positive guarantee for the possibility, i.e. its
provability, is equally question-begging.
There does not seem to exist any clear way to explicate the intuitionistic notion of
truth in the possibilist terms which does not either have unbearably implausible
consequences or is not hopelessly circular.
27 Timothy Williamson once suggested in conversation that there is one more option, namely metaphysical possibility. I
am personally inclined to agree, but the resulting view would certainly be quite alien for the anti-metaphysical spirit
of intuitionism, and I doubt that no intuitionist is prepared to base intuitionism on this notion.
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5. Conclusion
I will end by recalling what Heyting once said is the aim of intuitionism: ‘We look
for a basis of mathematics which is directly given and which we can immediately
understand without philosophical subtleties’ (Heyting 1974, p. 79). It is arguable that
after almost a hundred years of intensive attempts, intuitionism has not yet succeeded
in this. Above, we have examined the three basic choices there are for the intuitionistic
theory of truth, the strict actualism, the liberalized actualism and possibilism, and
found all them wanting.
6. Appendix: On the knowability of intuitionistic proofs
In this Appendix, I shall deal solely with the later intuitionism which has a more
positive view of logic than the orthodox intuitionism of Brouwer, according to which
mathematics is absolutely independent of logic. Indeed, much of contemporary
intuitionism, or constructivism, views mathematics simply as deriving theorems with
the help of intuitionistic logic from intuitionistically acceptable axioms (and whatever
principles used in proofs not covered by intuitionistic logic). Thus e.g. Bridges says
that in practice what the contemporary constructive mathematicians are doing
amounts to ‘doing mathematics with intuitionistic logic’ (Bridges 1997).
Another popular trend in the present-day intuitionism is to emphasize that one
should recognize a proof when one sees one.28 This idea derives from Kreisel, and has
been pressed repeatedly especially by Dummett. More formally, it is expressed by the
requirement that the proof relation must be decidable. It is indeed arguable that such
a requirement is necessary for the intuitionistic epistemology. It also harmonizes well
with Heyting’s view that ‘[a] mathematical construction ought to be so immediate to
the mind and its result so clear that it needs no foundation whatsoever’ (Heyting
1956b, p. 6).
The whole picture I want to consider here is beautifully expressed by Sundholm:
‘Proofs begin with immediate truths (axioms), which themselves are not justified
further by proof, and continue with steps of immediate inference, each of which
cannot further justified by proof’ (Sundholm 1983, p. 162). I shall next argue that the
two above ideas are incompatible. (Interestingly, also Beeson (1985) denies the
decidability of proof relation. He ends up with this conclusion somewhat differently
than the way I do.)
For simplicity, let us focus on the provability in the language of arithmetic L(HA).
Now given a finite sequence of formulas, it is certainly possible to check effectively
whether every step in it is an application of intuitionistically acceptable rule of
inference. But how about the premises? Only if one can in addition see that all the
premises of a derivation are intuitionistically true one can say that one has a proof of
the conclusion at hand. This is at least in principle possible if axiomhood is a decidable
property. However, in the intuitionistic setting, it cannot be! For if it was, the
intuitionistic provability could be captured by a formalized system. And then, by
Go¨del’s theorem, there would be truths that are unprovable, contrary to the basic
principle of intuitionism, which equates truth with provability.
The situation is actually even much worse—I doubt that it is generally realized
how bad it really is. Not only must the set of admissible axioms be undecidable. It
cannot be semi-decidable, i.e. recursively enumerable (S01), it cannot be Trial-and-Er-
28 See e.g. Sundholm 1983 and the many references therein.
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ror decidable (D02); it cannot be anywhere in the arithmetical hierarchy (not S
0
n for any
n). (Here I assume that the notions of arithmetical hierarchy, or at least the idea of
being definable in the language of arithmetic, make sense; in practice quite many con-
temporary intuitionists seem to accept them.) For assume that the property of being
an admissible axiom were definable by an arithmetical formula (however complex).
This implies that also provability is definable in the language of arithmetic. Then
one can apply Go¨del’s technique and construct a statement of the language which
is unprovable but true.
Thus the totality of intuitionistically provable sentences (already, restricted to
L(HA) i.e. the arithmetical sentences) necessarily is non-arithmetical, i.e. at least
hyperarithmetical (D11). But this means that they are just as abstract and inaccessible
as truth in classical arithmetic. The same holds already for the alleged axioms, that is,
‘the immediate truths’. But certainly non-arithmeticality makes the sphere of ‘the im-
mediate truths’ implausibly complex and inaccessible. If one cannot tell whether the
premises used in a derivation are acceptable, that is, true, or not, one cannot tell
whether one has a genuine proof before one’s eyes or not, contrary to the standard
assumption of contemporary intuitionism.
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